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31 Introduction
The study of policy implementation seems to some observers to have fallen
on relatively hard times.  Certain analysts have commented recently that there
have been few recent studies, relatively modest theoretical advance in recent
years, and a paucity of large-n investigations.  (For recent overviews of the
state of research in this specialty, along with recommendations for
advancement, see Lester and Goggin 1998; and, in response, deLeon 1999a;
Meier 1999; Schneider 1999; and Winter 1999.  See also deLeon 1999b.)  In
part, the relatively lessened attention to issues of implementation probably
reflects the less ambitious agendas of governments during the past decade.
Still, as O’Toole has argued elsewhere recently, the reports of difficulties and
lack of progress have exaggerated the current state of the field (2000).  While
there are shortcomings in the research literature, and while considerable
progress needs to be made, the situation is not at all bleak.  A number of
promising lines of work have developed in the last few years, even if less
obviously so than observers might prefer.  And sophisticated larger-n
investigations have by no means been rare.  (For a thorough assessment of
the literature and justification for these several conclusions, see O’Toole
2000.)
Indeed, the field is now poised and ready for significant moves forward.  The
point of this paper is to contribute directly to this development.  The purposes
here are, in fact, two.  First, and primarily, we present the outlines of a
theoretical approach to implementation that offers promise for delivering a
comprehensible, parsimonious, powerful, and yet nuanced explanation (and
prediction) about policy action.  In addition, we provide context for this
approach by connecting it to some contemporary developments in the
scholarship on policy theory.  In particular, since the theory sketched here is
heavily deductive, we offer some comparison with another recent and
prominent line of deductive theorizing that has appropriately drawn some
attention.  The objective here is both to outline a comparison of approaches
and also to indicate the overlaps, differences, and appropriate ways and
circumstances for their use.  The result is intended to inform researchers on
policy implementation of a plausible candidate theory, and strategy for theory
building, and also to indicate to the broader community of policy scholars how
this perspective fits within emerging developments beyond the implementation
question per se.
For while the issue of implementation continues to be an interesting and
robust subject attracting the attention of diverse scholars, it has been largely
true that with rare exceptions theoretical efforts on this subject have drawn
very heavily from inductive perspectives.  From the initial case study by
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) to the framework offered by Mazmanian and
Sabatier (1989), and from the insights of bottom-up theorists (for example Hull
with Hjern 1987) to the “third-generation” efforts of Goggin et al. (1990),
theory building in efforts to understand why certain forms of policy action
4follow authoritative governmental commitments have moved from the
specifics of detailed observation to general theoretical statements.
There is nothing wrong with inductive approaches per se.  But the field has
been so dominated by radically inductive perspectives (see O’Toole 1993 for
discussion) that certain weaknesses have also become significant.  One is the
sheer proliferation of variables proffered as plausible candidates for inclusion
in implementation theory. A review of hundreds of studies more than a decade
ago identified a dauntingly long list of such variables offered in the
international research literature (O’Toole 1986).  And there has been little
paring down since then.  In fact, Meier has commented sardonically on this
point by linking it to the prominence of case studies in the research literature:
"I often characterize the theory as `forty-seven variables that completely
explain five case studies' . . . .  I propose . . . [a]ny policy implementation
scholar who adds a new variable or a new interaction should be required to
eliminate two existing variables" (1999: 5-6).  Alternatively, "everyone who is
interested in policy implementation should pick one variable or relationship
and . . . [advocate] that it should be dropped from our theories" (p. 6). This
criticism is based on substantial exaggeration; and, as suggested earlier,
larger-n studies have become – if not commonplace  -- far from rarities.  But
the comments regarding the proliferation of variables are reasonable and
serve to suggest a problem for theory building.
For the sheer variety and complexity of the partial frameworks and theories
typically offered create difficulties in testing, accumulating insights, and
building powerful formulations.  The lack of parsimony has also contributed to
a certain vagueness in approaches offered.  The clarification of dependent
variables, let alone independent ones, has been a rather uneven effort, and a
result has been that it is sometimes difficult to know for certain when
propositions have been disconfirmed by evidence.  It is also a challenging
task to combine findings from different and often disparate studies into
anything approaching a rigorous meta-analysis.  Another corresponding
consequence has been that scholars have been reluctant to offer practical
suggestions for improving implementation performance. When advice is
offered, typically it has been fairly vague and obvious (see O’Toole 1986).
And it continues to remain largely true that practical suggestions are typically
“desultory and strategically vague” Elmore 1979-80: 601; efforts to craft
exceptions include Bardach 1998; O’Toole 1995; and perhaps Mazmanian
and Sabatier 1989: 41-42).
Indeed, we would argue that even should a fully specified and valid theory of
policy implementation command support, such a theory would be of only
limited immediate value to practitioners. The ceteris paribus assumption,
typically a part of theoretical propositions in such realms of research, violates
the real features of the world of practice, where variables can shift at the rate
of more than one at a time, interactive effects can be crucial, and the
complexity of a mature theory is likely to offer little direct guidance for decision
making.
5In short, then, two key points bear emphasis. The very heavily inductive
approaches that have dominated thus far have led to many interesting ideas
but not much accumulated and accepted theory. (The frequent reliance on
case studies has been a contributing limitation.) And the approaches that
have been emphasized have not led to much useful advice for practice.  (Nor,
we argue, are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future.)  Both points
undergird our efforts to propose a different approach to theory building to
explain – and perhaps predict and ultimately influence – policy action.  Instead
of continuing from an inductive orientation, we move to an explicitly deductive
perspective.  And the deductive logic offered here is structured so as to be
both parsimonious and also realistic.
These late-mentioned attributes – parsimony and realism – are difficult to
approach simultaneously.  Adding variables and complexity to a theoretical
approach can aid accuracy and thus realism, but at the expense of simplicity.
Deductive approaches, often derived from economics, are typically critiqued
on the basis of their lack of realism, despite their parsimony.  As explained
below, however, we use the notion of “core circumstances” as a filtering
device to allow for the play of complexity within, or through, a simplifying
prism assisting in paring down the long list of variables into a manageable
handful.  The objective is a highly predictive and comprehensive approach.
In general terms, it should perhaps be emphasized, we do not adopt a naive,
de novo logic in the deductive structure.  This theory has been developed
upon a basis of the extant implementation research findings, and partially on
the basis of the evidence suggesting the importance of a number of variable
clusters in driving policy action.  But we boil these down to a simple grounding
upon which a fairly subtle – and thus potentially realistic – set of propositions
is built.  The propositional inventory derived from the theoretical logic, in turn,
avoids the ceteris paribus complication that has stymied many other
approaches; this perspective, then, may be particularly helpful for those
interested in a practical logic with potential to aid implementers and others in
the real world of policy.
The turn to a deductive approach, particularly one based on the notion of
interaction among policy actors and strategic decision making at the core of
policy choice, may be reminiscent of some other recent theoretical efforts in
policy research.  (For a review of many of the most important contemporary
policy theories, both inductive and deductive, see Sabatier 1999.)  Aside from
economic theorizing per se, one might note in particular the work of Elinor
Ostrom and colleagues (see, for instance, Ostrom 1999 for a thorough review)
and the ideas of Fritz Scharpf (1993, and especially 1997) centered on the
approach called “actor-centered institutionalism” (see Mayntz and Scharpf
1995 as well).  (There are other candidate approaches that could be
mentioned.  Note, for instance, the contributions of Torenvlied 1996a and
1996b.  Thus far, however, Torenvlied’s ideas have not had a significant
impact on the international research literature.)
This is not the place for a careful review of these approaches.  What can be
said is that, while Ostrom’s approach offers considerable promise for
6explicating aspects of multiactor processes in complex institutional settings, it
seriously downplays both policies themselves and also governments as
distinctively important entities in policy settings.  For these reasons, we focus
instead here on the work of Scharpf.  Although his approach is not devoted
primarily to issues of implementation, it offers other features which, we think,
render it an important candidate for serious consideration by policy
researchers.  Accordingly, we devote attention in this analysis not only to
explicating our own approach but to offering some comparison with Scharpf’s
ideas.  The results may be of use to implementation scholars and also to
those with interests in policy theory more generally.
The basic structure of this article is straightforward.  Following a few additional
context-setting remarks, particularly on the kinds of policy theory that may be
most important to develop today, we indicate more carefully both why more
deductive approaches to implementation are necessary and also some
potential pitfalls in some such approaches that need to be avoided in this
effort.  We then sketch the basics of our “instrumentation theory.”  Once the
theory is outlined, it is compared with the perspective offered by “actor-
centered institutionalism.”  We then end with some conclusions and
implications.
Whither policy theory? To avoid confusion, we should be clear at the outset
what we do and do not mean by policy theory.  “Policy theory” in this
treatment means empirical theory intended to explain and/or predict policy
action, or action that emerges around a policy problem.  (And policy problems
are perceived situations or circumstances that some actors believe are or
ought to be subjects of attention by governments, their agents, and/or their
partners.)  Policy theory, then, does not mean theories imbedded in policies –
e.g., that building more highways is likely to relieve traffic congestion.  Nor
does policy theory refer to theories of how policy analysts can or should
assess the value or consequences of policy – e.g., benefit-cost analysis.  Our
attention, then, is devoted here to understanding the policy process, along
with its outputs.
Recent years have seen increasing attention paid by policy theorists to policy
making per se.  It has generally been recognized that often no strict
boundaries can be drawn between policy formation and policy implementation
(cf. Sabatier, 1991), and this realization seems to have lead to theories of the
policy process that – while not distinguishing between stages of the policy
process – nevertheless seem to be focused only on policy making examples
and thus miss consequential lessons that could be drawn from the wave of
implementation research that was particularly prominent in the 1970s and
1980s. Our position here, as suggested earlier, is that it is nevertheless
sensible to strive for solid and parsimonious theory for explaining action
during implementation.
Why does “policy implementation” deserves a separate theoretical treatment?
The classical stages model of the policy cycle raises the question of the
extent to which such apparently sequenced subprocesses are only analytical
7constructions or whether they can also be identified in real life. Setting political
agendas can be considered to be an aspect that is present in all policy
processes. The same can be said for evaluation. Feedback consists of shorter
and longer loops that lead to repetition in an altered form of other
subprocesses, and so would seem not to be a subprocess in its own right. In
short: if we are to use “real life” processes, then agenda setting, evaluation,
and feedback are possibly not separate subprocesses of the policy cycle.
Policy preparation and policy determination are in day-to-day empirical
practice often also so closely related that it is usually not worthwhile to
analyze these as separate processes. This leaves just two policy processes
from the traditional policy cycle: policy formation and policy implementation.
But what does this mean for the succession involvement and action of many
administrative levels in complex policy systems? (In European climate policy,
for example, these are the global, EU and national levels, and sometimes the
provincial and local levels.) What appears as policy implementation for one
level may be thought of as an aspect of policy formation for the next level. So
does the implementation “stage” lack anything systematically and inherently
distinctive?
In principle, we argue, it is possible to make an analytical distinction between
policy formation and policy implementation processes, respectively, that can
be useful for analyzing these processes. Policy formation processes are those
that involve turning diffuse inputs into a more focused output, and policy
implementation processes are processes that involve turning a more or less
focused input (the “policy”) into a number of diffuse outputs. When looked at
this way, though, making a distinction between policy formation and policy
implementation means that the analyst must first specify what this focused
output–input is.
Whether policy formation and policy implementation are different processes
depends on the question of whether there is a separate arena (playing field),
a mostly self-contained game that can reasonably be distinguished from
others, and a largely non-overlapping group of actors involved. In other words,
this is an empirical question. The answer will sometimes give cause to draw a
distinction between processes and sometimes not, depending on the goal of
the research (cf. DeLeon 1999b).
We conclude, therefore, that there can be systematic features of policy
implementation processes -- namely the institutional and resource context of
the policy (instruments) that are to be implemented. Precisely these features
are to be taken into account when analyzing these processes.
2 The need for more deductive approaches
What reasons compel a shift to more deductive approaches for understanding
the policy process? The recommendations made by policy analysts should
ideally act as a “catalyst” to the quality of the debate during policy processes
(cf. Quade, 1986). There are, however, various complications that might lead
actors in the policy process to “false learning,” rather than improved
8performance on the basis of recommendations. These can be summarized
sketchily (cf. Bressers, Herweijer, Korsten, 1993: 239-243): (1) concrete
proposals are almost never fully based on research (the identification of
negative factors only points in a direction about where to generate
improvements); (2) recommendations typically are grounded in too cursory
attention to cultural and institutional prerequisites; (3) often attention moves
prematurely to an option for choice rather than tolerate delay to seek  an
extension of possibilities (thus, real life “experiments” are typically foreclosed);
(4) “away-from-the-problem” suggestions might generate new problems or
prove to be only partial solutions to isolated difficulties that do not change the
negative overall pattern when changed; (5) and “knowing how to win the last
war” is not necessarily apropos as a route to problem solving in new, at least
partially unprecedented situations.
These observations not only lead to a plea to analysts for modesty and for
emphasizing an increase of the learning capacity of policy actors rather than
to try to replace them with authoritative advise. They also suggest the
conclusion that case-by-case learning is insufficient to “store” and “refine”
knowledge of public-policy processes, and that “probabilistic” theories bridge
the gap between lessons learned in one case and applications in other cases.
Many implementation studies set out not only to identify policy outputs, but also
to explain them. These explanations vary from case to case, and the relevant
scholarship has put forward a vast array of factors – as suggested earlier. The
policy may have run aground because “the municipalities responsible for
implementation were not sufficiently motivated,” “there were staff shortages,”
“the guidelines arrived late,” “the applicants did not understand the subsidy
arrangements,” “there was insufficient support in society,” “the statements of the
undersecretary spread confusion in the media,” and so forth. There are two
disadvantages to such ad-hoc explanations. First of all, although they may
contain some degree of truth, they rarely tell the whole story. Typically, the
identified factor(s) exert influence in combination with other factors which, in and
of themselves, need not adversely affect implementation. For instance, a lack of
motivation on the part of the municipal managers to implement the policy is only
a decisive factor if these local managers enjoy a large degree of discretion (or
can afford to act as if they have it). However, a large degree of discretion in itself
need not prevent effective implementation.  Relying on ad-hoc explanations,
therefore, tends to support recommendations that are more like proverbs than
anything else (O’Toole 1986).
Secondly, ad-hoc explanations do not engender a cumulation of knowledge
about factors that influence policy implementation. The extant studies show little
uniformity, being based on different terms and levels of abstraction. As a result,
information from new research often cannot be tested against predictions based
on earlier research. It is possible, up to a point, to induce certain general factors
from the concrete ones mentioned in the various studies (see Hoogerwerf 1977,
cf. Sabatier & Mazmanian 1980, Mazmanian & Sabatier 1989). But the interac-
tions between these general factors, the way in which they reinforce or weaken
each other's influence, is rarely taken into consideration. Another drawback is
that they tend to remain fairly abstract. As a result, they are not often used in
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clear classification of ad-hoc explanations. But to achieve cumulative
knowledge, it is vital to develop theories with explanatory power.
Deductive theory has important strengths, and we have chosen this approach
for these reasons.  But it is important to remember that there are limitations as
well.  One derives from earlier work.  An important segment of existing
deductive theory about policy instruments consists of economic literature in
which targets’ responses, predominantly those of companies, to the
application of various instruments are dealt with. The models that evolve from
such literature often appear very sophisticated. In some cases the complex
character of decision making is carefully dealt with.   Nevertheless economic
theory is often based on an objective-rational decision making model,
sometimes even calculating pros and cons merely on the basis of monetary
assets. Of course such a model is easy to use but very limited in terms of
realism.  A first improvement – one also often used by economists – is to
emphasize the subjective character of the weighting done by target group
actors. Actors do not choose on the basis of their actual circumstances, but
on the basis of their perceptions about these.  These perceptions may well be
restricted to only part of the real behavioral alternatives and their
characteristics. They can also be “wrong.” Furthermore decision makers might
have to deal with uncertainty. Secondly, the subjective model also means that
the influence of the pros and cons is modified by the various weights that
actors attribute to these aspects. Here also the importance of short-term
versus long- term perspectives and uncertainty avoidance play a part.
Additional limitations can be mentioned briefly.  For instance, altruistic, social
mimicry, and legal normative motives can in principle be included in individual
motives, but in practice these need separate attention in order not to be
forgotten in the “homo economicus” model.
A different sort of limitation has to do with the tendencies of economic
analyses to treat implementation issues lightly, in general.  Many economic
deductive models are based on the assumption that the policy will be
implemented as decided upon. This is however far from sure and deserves an
own and very important part of the model.
Often deductive approaches focus implicitly on a one-actor decision-making
model. But many actors are complex or “corporate” ones. Whether it is
justifiable to treat them as single actors is a question that deserves attention
in each study.  (Indeed, our approach offers refinements for multiactor
decision making circumstances, where – for instance – target groups are
themselves may be less than united in perspective during a policy’s
implementation.)
Finally, it is important when developing deductive implementation theory to
avoid the trap of an implicitly top-down assumption.  Target group actors are
not in the business of responding to implemented policies, but in the business
of minding their own business. Often the incentives that are provided by the
policies are seen by such groups as merely a part – perhaps a small part – of
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the array of constraints and resources in their own environments of action:
possibly something to reckon with, but not vital or compelling from their
perspective (cf. Elmore 1979).
For all these reasons, we aim for a general deductive approach that has
potential to explain policy action and captures as much as possible of the
advantages and as less as possible of the disadvantages connected to
deductive approaches.
We base this work on initial theoretical efforts developed in the Netherlands – an
approach called “instrumentation theory.” The theory derives its name from the
fact that it was developed to facilitate the comparison of policy instruments (and
not from a perspective that views implementation action in entirely instrumental
terms or as action that can and should be controlled by central authorities). One
of its basic assumptions is that the operation of policy instruments cannot be
seen in isolation from the circumstances in which they are applied. The theory
therefore not only looks at the characteristics of policy instruments and their
impact on target groups, but also at implementation processes. (For the first
version, see Bressers & Klok 1987; 1988. After a series of generally
encouraging empirical studies -- for instance Klok 1987; Grimbergen et al. 1988;
Kraan-Jetten, 1991 --, revisions led to a refined version; see Klok 1991.
Additional empirical studies have followed; for instance, Pullen, 1992.)  Here we
aim to bring the approach to the attention of a broader international community
of specialists and connect it to some of the important contemporary policy
perspectives.  Given space limitations, the theoretical material itself is presented
only in summary form here.
3 “Instrumentation Theory”: A Brief Sketch
This section presents some of the core elements of instrumentation theory,
with an emphasis on its guiding assumptions and overall deductive logic.  For
present purposes, we omit derivations of all the detailed propositions.  We
also, of necessity, avoid elaboration of variants of the core argument crafted
to deal with more complex settings.  For instance, taking into account
implementation target groups as complex rather than unitary actors is a task
that has been tackled in the theoretical project (see for instance Bressers
1998; Bressers and O’Toole 1998; Ligteringen 1999).  But these aspects are
not central to the current exposition and are therefore omitted from this
coverage.  We move, instead, directly to the basic elements of the
instrumentation theory in general.
Interaction processes and instrumentation theory
Thinking in terms of policy processes suggests emphasizing their character as
social interaction processes.  Doing so shifts attention from viewing policy as
a sort of production process with semifinished products and an ultimate end
product to a vision in which the actors participating in the process are the
central concern. In this perspective the course and outcomes of the processes
depend not only on inputs but mainly on the characteristics of the actors
involved, particularly their objectives, information, and power. All other factors
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that influence the process do so because, and in so far as, they influence the
characteristics of the actors involved. This point holds as well for the influence
achieved by policy instruments. Not all characteristics of actors, however, are
determined by policy, and so it is not possible to describe a policy without
paying attention to the actors involved in that policy. These actors, therefore,
can be displayed explicitly in a graphic model of the policy (Bressers, 1983),
Moreover, we conceive of the processes not as linked merely in one series or
cycle, but via connection with a large number of societal processes in which
government authorities sometimes participate and sometimes do not. All
these processes are connected to still other ones in a complicated web by
means of their inputs and outputs, and possibly indirectly linked to all other
processes. Each definition of a sector of society draws a more or less
arbitrary boundary round a cluster of processes in this web.
The “instrumentation theory” which derives from this perspective focuses on
the application and effects of instruments on the target groups of policy
(Bressers & Klok 1987, 1988; Klok 1991) and later also on the choice of policy
instruments (Ligteringen 1999, Bressers & O’Toole 1998).1 In this paper we
will focus on the modules that deal with implementation processes.
Explaining implementation with “Instrumentation Theory”
The theory assumes that the policy implementation process is not only about
achieving implementation, but also about attempts to prevent implementation or
to change the character of what is implemented. The process involves activities
and interactions between the implementing government officials and the
members of the target group. Often the same actors already maintain contact
with each other in connection with other matters. Moreover government and
target group often exert influence on each other before the policy that is to be
implemented is introduced. The new policy does not replace this interactive
process, but adds a new element to it. Therefore, to assess the possibility of the
new instruments being applied and correctly applied, it is necessary first of all to
gain insight into the factors determining the nature of the interactive process
between government and target group. We can then try to find out how these
factors change due to the introduction of the new policy instruments (Bressers &
Ringeling, 1989, 1995).
Another basic assumption of the theory is that the factors which influence the
implementation process do not operate in isolation from each other (cf. Mayntz,
1983). The influence of the various factors cannot be simply added up. A factor
that exercises a positive influence under certain circumstances may exercise no
influence, or indeed a negative influence, under other circumstances. The way
in which these processes develop must therefore be explained on the basis of
combinations of the values of the various distinctive factors. A crucial point,
therefore, is that this means that hypotheses about the relationship between the
dependent variable and only one independent variable at the time, with a
“ceteris paribus” assumption regarding other independent variables, are
regarded as unproductive.
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Though this basic assumption is undoubtedly more realistic, it creates severe
complexity problems for theory formulation. In fact, if one assumes 15
independent variables to be important to the development and results of the
implementation process, than even if one treats these variables as dichotomies,
no less than 32,768 combinations of circumstances or “settings” can occur! And
even leaving aside concerns of parsimony, because many of the relevant
variables cannot validly be operationalized as quantitative measures
computerized modeling provides no escape.
Instead, this complexity is made “manageable” by distinguishing two sets of
independent variables. These are “core circumstances” (that is, factors that
have a direct influence on the development of the processes) and external
circumstances (factors that have an indirect influence via their influence on the
core circumstances). The applied policy instruments can be counted among
these “external circumstances.” The theory indicates how the core circum-
stances jointly determine the development and results of a process. External
circumstances, including characteristics of the policy instruments that are to be
implemented, are taken into consideration when estimating the value of the core
circumstances. In this way many circumstances can be taken into account
without increasing exponentially the complexity of the theory. In this fashion,
therefore, we craft a theory that is both deductive and also realistic – that is, it
takes into account the complexity of the circumstances without being
overwhelmed by the complications.  The number of settings remains limited as
they are determined by a limited number of central circumstances.
These central circumstances are the goals, information and sources of power of
the actors involved. These three have proved themselves to be exceptionally
useful in explaining the dynamics of such processes (see Bressers 1983: 189-
197 for an explanation of why these three in particular are essential).
Another way of illustrating their rich significance is to relate these three factors
to the often used division into the three “steering mechanisms” of incentives
(objectives), communication (information) and directives (power). A third is the
link with some of the general perspectives of the several social science
disciplines.
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Scientific Perspectives Individual Social
Resources (power) a. The greatest benefit
will be chosen
(Economics)
b. Those with most
power can choose
(Political Science)
Cognitions (information) c. It is not the facts that
are important but how
what is observed is
interpreted
(Sociology / Psychology)
d. Interpretations of
reality are the product
of social construction
(Social psychology /
Communication science)
Values (objectives) e. People should want
what is good
(Ethics)
f. The limits to what is
good are set by rules
(Law)
All this serves to stress that objectives, information and power are not just a
sample of key factors from a population of equally important alternatives, but
in our view really “cover the ground” of the relevant characteristics of actors in
social interaction processes.
In the next subsection we will elaborate this perspective for two aspects of
implementation processes. The first focuses on whether there will be
implementation at all. Some envisaged implementation processes never really
take off for certain sub-sectors or at certain local sites; or even, on occasion,
in general. The second aspect deals with the degree of correct
implementation. “Correct” is not conceptualized in the judicial sense here, but
in the sense that the implementation approach supports rather than weakens
the intended incentives that the instrumentation produces. Since
implementation can proceed at the price of substantially weakening the
intended incentives for the target group’s behavior (e.g. fully using the budget
of a subsidy program without checking the recipients behavior), it makes
sense to give special attention to this aspect also.
Likelihood of implementation
The policy implementation process is typically characterized by the interactions
between the government and the target group of the policy. The application of a
certain policy instrument often takes up a less prominent place in this process
than one would be led to expect on the basis of official procedures. The actual
granting of permits to those members of the target group who are required to
hold permits, the actual imposition of levies, the application of sanctions when
regulations are violated: none of these can be taken for granted in the practical
process. The first result of the implementation process can therefore be
indicated as the possibility or likelihood that the instrument will be applied at all.
Sometimes this result may have the side-effect of undermining the credibility of
the policy, particularly if implementation fails to get off the ground.
It is quite conceivable that not only the members of the target group but also the
government body responsible for implementation attach little importance to the
application of the instrument. Implementers have values and interests of their
own, which may not coincide with the activities involved or even the policy as
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such. Symbolic policy is a well-known phenomenon in many nations – that is,
policy that is not taken seriously by implementers, and perhaps is not meant to
be, and that is not supported by serious commitments of resources.   So the first
group of factors that determines whether policy instruments are applied consists
of the objectives of the implementers and the target group. To put it more
specifically, the central question is whether the actual application of the instru-
ment will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of these actors.
The successful application of policy instruments also depends on whether those
involved have sufficient information. The first question to ask in this connection
is whether the policy implementers know who make up the target group. Do they
know, for instance, which companies are obliged to have a permit or which ones
qualify for a subsidy? If the target group itself stands to gain from the application
of the instrument, for instance in the case of subsidies, then information
available to the members of the target group may also help to increase the
likelihood of application. This concerns information about the way in which they
can benefit from the instrument.
The third group of factors that determines the development of the
implementation process is the distribution of power between the implementers
and the members of the target group. First of all, who is empowered to apply the
instrument and how far does this power go? The power might rest exclusively
with the implementers. But in some cases, for example, with subsidies, the
instrument can only be applied at the request of the members of the target
group. The target group then enjoys an extremely strong position if it is not in
favor of the application of the instrument. Other forms of power may derive from
formal sources (as with opportunities to appeal) and informal sources (like
dependence on another party for the achievement of other objectives).
The combination of these circumstances determines the kind of interaction that
will occur between government and target group in the policy implementation
process. The theory makes a distinction between three types of interaction:
active cooperation, passive cooperation and opposition. Active cooperation
occurs when both parties share a common goal. We speak of passive
cooperation when one of the parties adopts a relatively passive attitude that
neither hinders nor stimulates the application of the policy instrument.
Opposition occurs when one of the actors tries to prevent application by the
other actor. There are also situations in which there will be no interaction at all
between the government and the target group. In this case the possibility that
the instrument will be applied is very remote indeed.
Diagram 1 gives an overview of the circumstances in the implementation
process and the types of interaction and results to be expected from the
application of instruments in these circumstances. Each situation contains a
configurational hypothesis. For instance situation 1 can be read as: If application
contributes positively to the achievement of the objectives of both the
implementers and the target group, and the implementers’ information is
sufficient, then the interaction will be “active cooperation” and the likelihood of
application will be “very great.”2
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Degree of correct implementation
The mere application of a policy instrument does not automatically lead to the
envisaged change in the consequences of the behavioral alternatives of the
target group. The application may not be up to standard; for instance, levies
may be lower than originally intended, or permits may not specify restrictive
regulations, or grants may not be accompanied by the intended conditions. The
question in such cases is not whether the policy implementers themselves are
breaking the law or other regulations, nor whether they deviate from the
instrument-as-intended as such. Empirical implementation research has shown
that deviations can actually be motivated by concern for goal-attainment by the
implementers. The dependent variable here is whether the impact of the instru-
ment on the consequences of the behavioral alternatives of the target group is
less far-reaching than originally envisaged by the policy makers.
The factors that determine the character of the interaction process between
government and target group on this point are virtually identical to those
mentioned earlier: objectives, information and power. Nevertheless, we still
need a separate analysis, depicted below via another diagram,  since the factors
may take on very different values and the types of interaction are more complex
than those that occur in respect of the likelihood of application. For instance, the
members of the target group may well favor the application of a subsidy in itself,
but oppose correct application as this would bind them to all sorts of regulations.
Or, in another situation, implementers may have sufficient information to identify
those members of the target group who require permits, but have insufficient
information to know what regulations should and can be applied to the
companies in question.
The types of interaction that may occur in connection with correct application are
to a certain extent different from those linked to the possibility of application.
This is because the degree of correct application involves a much larger number
of aspects. The degree of correct application, for instance, not only concerns the
question whether a company required to have a permit will indeed obtain one,
but also whether that permit will be adequate, that is, contain all regulations
necessary to achieve the policy objective. It is precisely the formulation of these
regulations that is the most difficult part of the negotiations between government
and industry. Furthermore, the concept “degree of correct application” assumes
that a certain degree of application takes place. If the instruments are not
applied, the degree of correct application lacks all significance. The application
of policy instruments almost necessarily leads to interaction, so it will be
impossible for the result to be “no” interaction, as in diagram 1. A distinction is
made between constructive, but also obstructive, cooperation, negotiation and
conflict. Obstructive active cooperation occurs in situations where both actors
stand to gain from incorrect application. The same phenomenon may occur with
passive cooperation when one or both parties have an interest in the application
of the instrument – for example, because non-application would be rather too
obvious to higher authorities -- but not in the correct application of the
instrument. In view of the many elements involved in the correct application of
the instrument, it is useful to subdivide the interaction type “opposition” into
negotiation and conflict. In the case of negotiations, the parties do their utmost
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to realize as many of their own objectives as possible by reaching a
compromise. In the case of conflict, the target group usually breaks the lines of
communication and confronts the other party with a negative use of power. In
the latter case, the target group will generally question the legality of the
instrument. Finally, with some combinations of circumstances the interaction
type and result are highly uncertain.
Diagram 2 gives an overview of the situations and predicted interaction types as
well as expected results, in terms of the degree of correct application of the
instrument.3
The implementation of a policy may involve the deployment of more than one
instrument (an example is analyzed empirically in Yu et al. 1998). In fact,
different instruments are frequently applied at different stages of implementation.
For instance, the first step in applying a permit system would be to issue permits
specifying certain regulations; the second step would then be to enforce these
regulations. Therefore, to generate a comprehensive explanation of the results,
the parts of the theory described here will often have to be applied several
times.
4 A Comparison with “Actor-Centered Institutionalism”
The ultimate value of this theoretical approach can only be judged through
testing -- and, in terms of its practical value, an assessment of its predictive
and diagnostic utility in the policy process.  We do not undertake systematic
testing here, but this section does offer additional context for understanding
the approach.  It does so by rendering a brief comparison with the game-
theoretic perspective developed by Fritz Scharpf.  The point is to demonstrate
the ways in which instrumentation theory is related to but also distinct from
another recently sketched deductive approach to understanding policy action.
Such a comparison can permit more direct assessments by others of the
possible added value of this approach to implementation research.  And it
may also aid further theory building itself by suggesting the relative
advantages and disadvantages to these somewhat related but different
perspectives.
Scharpf’s approach is not directed at questions of implementation per se, as
is instrumentation theory.  It holds the potential for some application there,
nonetheless, and game-theoretic logic has been explored by others to
suggest its strengths and limitations in implementation analyses (see O’Toole
1993; 1995).  The comparison, therefore, is directly relevant to the issues at
hand.
In his recent overview of policy science approaches, Sabatier (1999) classifies
the game theory of Scharpf (1997) with the institutional rational choice
approach (see above). There is something to be said for this categorization.
Nevertheless, Scharpf and collaborators highlight a few points omitted by the
most prominent proponent of an institutional rational choice perspective,
Ostrom (et al.).  Scharpf calls his approach “actor-centered institutionalism,”
and with good reason: much attention is paid to the “actor constellations.” The
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goal and structure of the approach appear generally similar to those of
instrumentation theory, namely that the course and outcome of processes are
explained. Both place the interplay of policy-relevant actors into the
foreground of analysis.  Neither gives a priori primacy to a particular category
of policy actors, thus avoiding a problem that plagued some earlier versions of
implementation theory. And both structure analyses to permit consideration of
more complex and interactive circumstances, via connected games (in
Scharpf’s work) or interactions among instruments (in instrumentation theory).
Further, the approach is based primarily on individual rational actors, although
values other than self-interest are also taken into account. As with
instrumentation theory “the co-existence of norm-oriented and self-interested
preferences” (Scharpf, 1997: 181) is taken for granted (though the basic
interpretations of game situations seem largely based on an assumption of
self-interested individuals).
We should notice here that Scharpf does not really pay attention to the kind of
context that is typical for implementation processes. Where he deals with
implementation  per se (pp. 117-118) he is actually referring to what we would
label the chance for compliance with the agreement. His notion is not about
implementation as a process of coming to an individualized “agreement” (or
authoritative decision) in the context of a specific policy. He pushes aside the
issue in a rather easy way by stating that implementability issues, like
enforcement, should be part of the agreement itself contributing to the
difficulty of reaching the agreement.  For that reason, he indicates, the rest of
his argument deals only with the difficulties that must be overcome in reaching
agreement through negotiations (page 118).  In this fashion, of course, he
eliminates the nitty-gritty questions of implementation by assumption. This
leads us to the questions of what the specific characteristics of the
implementation context are, and how they are incorporated in instrumentation
theory as compared to game theory.
Implications of the implementation context
Some characteristics of implementation processes imply that specific
situations in terms of a game-theoretic context are more likely than others.
These concern two aspects of game-solution possibilities, in particular. First,
typical implementation processes allow the possibility to communicate
between both (all) parties. In fact they consist primarily of such
communication. Second, typical implementation institutions have the option to
make the outcome of interaction binding. In fact the implementation of many
policy instruments is formally about producing a binding output at the level of
the individual member of the target group of a general policy instrument.
These can include a conditioned allowance of a subsidy, a license, a sanction,
a levy invoice, and so forth.  (Technically, this second point can be
incorporated into a game-theoretic analysis through the notion of default
conditions that apply under some options, like noncooperation by target
groups.  Of course, this addition complicates any analysis.)
Another important characteristic refers to the “interaction orientations” (pp. 84-
89) in implementation processes. The valuable analysis Scharpf gives here
shows first of all that aside from the characteristics of the game itself, the
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interaction orientation has a large effect of the predicted outcome, and
secondly that the “normal” interpretation of the various games in fact is one
that is based on a individualistic rationality assumption. In actual
implementation processes, of course, the values of maintaining good relations
or the hostility that was produced by previous encounters between
implementers and targets groups (Arentsen and Bressers, 1991) make a
variety of interaction orientations quite plausible.
The characteristics mentioned above suggest that implementation situations
have some parallels with game-theoretic settings, but they refer to specific
situations that should be heeded in the analysis. There are, however, also
differences that can be ignored only by omitting key elements of many actual
empirical situations. These characteristics will result in a reconceptualization
of central variables of game theory, or in the introduction of additional
variables.
The first of the major differences is the fact that in implementation there is a
formally adopted policy instrument that (at least in an analytical sense) serves
as the focus or input of the interaction. This implies that in implementation the
actors not only have a strategic orientation towards each other (as in a game-
theoretic setting), but also have an equally important strategic orientation
towards the policy instrument that has to be implemented. This means that
the primary interest constellation of the actors (as one of the independent
variables) is not defined in terms of their preferences for defection or
cooperation towards each other, but in terms of their preferences regarding
the implementation of the instrument. In instrumentation theory these
preferences are referred to in variables such as “the consequences of
implementation for goal attainment of the policy implementers.” This slightly
different strategic orientation in implementation (as opposed to a game
theoretic setting) also has implications for the dependent variables of the
interaction. Whereas game theory is concerned with reaching stable
cooperation between actors, this is important, but not the entire story in
implementation, for actors might find themselves perfectly happy in an
agreement (cooperation) not to implement the instrument (or implement it only
in a symbolic way). In instrumentation theory this results in a specification of
the basic forms of interaction, where constructive cooperation (resulting in
highly correct implementation) is distinguished from obstructive cooperation
(resulting in low correct implementation, or even “no interaction” in terms of
the likelihood of implementation). Whereas both forms of cooperation could be
seen as a “solution” (that is, a Nash equilibrium) in terms of game theory, it is
obvious that the latter would not count as a solution from an implementation
theory.
The second major difference between game and implementation contexts has
to do with the fact that game theory has limited its scope towards behavioral
(strategic) choice, whereas implementation includes choice, but also has (by
nature of its activity) important elements of production. This means that
besides the preferences or motivation for actions, the actors’ abilities or
capacity to actually perform the action of his choice are equally important. If
an implementer decides to close down a factory that operates without a
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license, it is not enough to write the management a letter stating “from day X
your factory is closed.” Although it is not impossible that the management
would respond to such a letter by actually closing the factory down, in most
cases additional actions by the implementer would be needed. In game theory
the actual performance of the defect and cooperate strategies is usually
deemed unproblematic. In instrumentation theory the “information” and
“power” variables are incorporated to refer to the ability of the actors to
perform actions.
The consequences of these two points can be illustrated by relating the
outcomes regarding “likelihood of implementation” to the basic interest
orientation of the actors involved (as would be the standard game theoretic
approach). Instrument implementation theory accepts three values each, for
the “interest” variables. In situations in which neither of the two parties is really
in favor of actual implementation the theory indicates that no interaction will
occur. More interesting are the five situations in which at least one of the
parties has an interest in implementation. In situations where there is no real
clash of interests the information of the actor(s) willing to implement the
instrument becomes crucial for the likelihood of implementation. In situations
with a clear clash of interests (upper right and lower left), the constellation can
be compared to a mixed-motive (or, in the extreme cases, zero-sum) game,
where in addition to information the actors’ power position becomes an
important variable.
Likelihood of implementation
Interest in Implementers
implementation + 0 -
+ (if enough info of (if enough info of (depending on
implementers): target group): info target group
Target collaboration co-operation and power)
group
0 (if enough info of no no
implementers): implementation implementation
co-operation
- (depending on info no no
implementers and implementation implementation
power)
A further important characteristic of implementation processes is their
hierarchical nature, at least in a formal sense. Although implementation
research has learned that in many cases negotiation would be a better label
than hierarchy, the result of these processes would still be a formally
authoritative decision by the implementer. The actual characteristics of most
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implementation processes could therefor perhaps best be described as
“negotiation in the context of hierarchy” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 198). Scharpf
draws some attention to games in such a context, where he describes
negotiation between two sections of a ministerial department (pp. 198-200). In
this context the sections negotiate under the condition that if they do not reach
an agreement a third actor, the minister, would take an authoritative decision
and the game would be “out of their hands.” This context is however different
from most implementation contexts in the sense that one of the players (the
implementer) has the authority to take the decision. This complicates the
strategic situation, for one of the players has the option to play his
“hierarchical cards” by “going by the book,” or opt for a possibly less
conflictual negotiation strategy. In turn, the other actor has possibilities, for
instance by appearing cooperative or belligerent, to influence this choice. In
this sense the actual conditions under which the game is played are part of
the game itself.
This is related to a further important characteristic of implementation
processes: the options of the players are not fixed. Whereas in game theory
the players usually only have the cooperate or defect options, in
implementation the actual outcome (and thus the strategic consequences of
cooperation and defection) are in most cases negotiable because of discretion
of the implementers. By negotiating a solution that is more or less acceptable
to both players, the actors have the possibility of trading strictness of
implementation for mutual cooperation (cf. Heckathorn/Maser, 1987, referred
to in: Scharpf, 1997: 77). In this sense not only the conditions but also the
actors’ alternatives and their consequences are part of the game.
The fact that negotiation over the outcome is possible draws attention to a
further aspect of implementation: the actors are usually in a dependency
relation, where the power balance between them might vary from “domination”
to “more or less even.” Obviously, many policy instruments are envisioned
precisely to produce dependencies as a mechanism to change current
practices of target groups. Scharpf’s analysis (pp. 139-141) of the influence of
forms of dependency on a “battle of the sexes” game shows the important
implications of a difference in dependency. Dependency seems even more
important in situations where the balance of power can influence the
(non)cooperative nature of the game, or even influence the nature of the
solution that the actors would find “acceptable” (the two points indicated
above).
This brings us to the question of how these aspects are incorporated in
instrumentation theory. The possibility of negotiating an acceptable solution is
incorporated in the hypotheses that cover the correctness of implementation.
Negotiation is distinguished as a form of interaction, and its possible
consequences for the correctness of implementation are indicated. The
dependencies between actors are covered by the variables indicating their
power positions. The balance of power is used both as a factor that explains
where the likely position of a negotiated solution will be found and as a factor
that explains whether actors would opt for a hierarchical (confrontational), a
negotiating, or a more cooperative strategy. Whereas negotiation would
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generally decrease the correctness of implementation, a confrontational
strategy has implications for the legitimacy of implementation (and
subsequently for the orientation of the target group in their decisions).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to show that deductive approaches are a
promising way of proceeding for implementation theory and research.
Instrumentation theory offers the prospect of a realistic version thereof, thus
addressing some of the central issues plaguing implementation theory.
Comparing instrumentation theory with actor-centered institutionalism is
helpful: the similarities and differences show the relative advantage that each
has under different circumstances. Actor-centered institutionalism offers a
broader scope and, by way of its connection to game theory, an important and
widely-known theoretical content. Instrumentation theory focuses more
specifically on implementation, a point that counts as a disadvantage in terms
of generality, but as an advantage in terms of its being more realistic in its
assumptions concerning the characteristics of these processes.
The similarities between the two suggest a path that theorizing can
productively take. The parallels are broader than might be apparent at first
glance. The strategy of reducing complexity via key assumptions is very
similar between the two lines of theorizing. The “models of the actor”
resemble each other closely as well.  Furthermore, the links between the
context and the orientations of actors are very similar.  Finally, the line of
reasoning predicting outcomes is in both cases based on strategic choice
(though this is rather implicit in instrumentation theory).
The differences point to reasons why instrumentation theory may be
particularly apropos for issues of implementation. Its focus on implementation
not only builds upon realistic assumptions -- compared with other deductive
approaches --, but also enables it to predict well-specified outcomes that can
be useful both in empirical research and in application by practitioners.  And
this, after all, is the major objective of theory building on such a topic.
One of the lines of work that could be advanced in the future is to develop a
closer connection between instrumentation theory and actor-centered
institutionalism. Instrumentation theory might profit from a more explicit
connection to the different game-theoretic situations that are implied by the
situations forming the theory’s hypotheses. Indeed, it might be useful to
consider the linked-game character of the two aspects of implementation
outlined earlier (that is, likelihood of implementation and degree of correct
implementation, respectively).  Actor-centered institutionalism might profit
from the notions in instrumentation theory about the specific characteristics of
implementation processes and the way in which these can be modeled to
form a more realistic representation of the strategic situations in which actors
find themselves.  In these fashions and perhaps others, these distinct but
related theoretical approaches might both be enhanced.
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1 Additional developments in the theory take also account of the fact that instruments do not
influence the characteristics of the actors involved separately but rather as a package or as
an “instrumentation strategy” (see also Yu et al. 1998). Instruments and strategies have
various properties, for example a certain proportionality between target group behavior and
government reaction, or provision vs. withdrawal of resources to/from the target group. Such
features affect their applicability in practice. Klok emphasizes that some of the instruments
are designed to give those implementing the policy the power to apply still other instruments
(Klok 1991: 176-194) and also that the implementing organizations depend on being
equipped with sufficient capacity and expertise (idem: 163-164; see also Bressers 1983: 218-
237 and 256-274). Arentsen (1991) exhaustively discusses the relation between the policy
organization and policy implementation in the framework of this theory. Later publications on
this approach (Bressers & Kuks 1992; Bressers 1993; Bressers, O’Toole & Richardson 1994;
Bressers, Huitema & Kuks 1994) have paid more attention to the interrelations between the
actors, including actors that do not directly participate in the processes under examination.
Klok (1995) gives primary importance to the allocation and removal of resources in such
relations and in the classification of policy instruments. The mutual relations between actors
within such policy networks are seen as an important factor in the development of the content
of policy (Ligteringen 1999). In addition, the relation between policy processes at the various
administrative levels is explicitly dealt with (Bressers, Kuks & Ligteringen 1998). Therefore the
perspective has developed into an integrative approach, uniting elements from a variety of
other approaches.  Again, nonetheless, we omit treatment of such features here.
2 The flow chart rests on nine assumptions, four refer to the type of interaction that is to be
expected, five refer to the expected outcomes:
1. For any interaction to evolve, it is necessary that application of the instrument contributes
positively to at least one actor, and that this actor has sufficient information to apply the
instrument;
2. In addition to assumption 1, active cooperation will evolve when application contributes
positively to the objectives of both actors, passive cooperation will evolve when
application contributes positively to the objectives of one, and neither positively nor
negatively (none) to the objectives of the other actor;
3. If a request by the target group is necessary for application, the target group can veto
application and prevent interaction;
4. In addition to assumptions 1 and 3, conflicting objectives of the actors (one positive, the
other negative) will, in case of balanced power positions (both strong or weak) result in
opposition as the type of interaction. In case the power position is in favor of one of the
actors, the actor that is dominated will refrain from putting his preferences into action;
5. Without interaction the likelihood of application of the instrument is very small;
6. In case of active cooperation, the likelihood of application will be very great;
7. In case of passive cooperation and the active actor is able to apply the instrument
himself, the likelihood of application is very great. If however the cooperation of the
passive actor is also necessary, the likelihood of application is great;
8. In case of opposition and balanced power positions the likelihood of application is
average;
9. There will be a loss of credibility in case a very small likelihood of application is related to
the preferences (objectives) of the implementer or his insufficient information.
3 This flow chart rests on eleven additional assumptions, six refer to the type of interaction that is
to be expected, five refer to the expected outcomes:
1. If correct application of the instrument contributes in the same way to the objectives of the
actors, the interaction type will be active cooperation. In case this contribution is positive
the active cooperation will be constructive, in case it is negative the cooperation will be
obstructive;
2. If correct application of the instrument contributes positively to the objectives of one of the
actors and not significantly to the objectives of the other, the interaction type will be
constructive passive cooperation. If correct application of the instrument contributes
negative to the objectives of one of the actors and not significantly to the objectives of the
other, the interaction type will be obstructive passive cooperation. If correct application
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has no contribution to the objectives of both actors, it is uncertain which type of
interaction will occur;
3. The first two assumptions have to be modified in the sense that it is uncertain which
interaction type will occur in case both actors have insufficient information and the
interaction would have been constructive;
4. In case of conflicting objectives (one positive, the other negative), and the actor for whom
correct application will contribute positive to his objectives has insufficient information, the
interaction type negotiation will occur;
5. In case of conflicting objectives (one positive, the other negative), and the actor for whom
correct application will contribute positive to his objectives has sufficient information, but
the power balance is dominated by the other actor, the interaction type negotiation will
occur. If in the same case the power balance is in favor of the actor who want to apply
correctly, the interaction type constructive passive cooperation will occur. If the power of
the actors is in balance, either negotiation or conflict will occur;
6. In case of conflicting objectives and correct application contributes negatively to the
objectives of the implementer, and the target group has insufficient information, the
interaction type obstructive passive cooperation will occur;
7. In case of constructive (active or passive) cooperation the degree of correct application of
the instrument will be very great;
8. In case of obstructive (active or passive) cooperation the degree of correct application of
the instrument will be very small;
9. In case of conflict the degree of correct application will be very great, but there will also
be a loss of legitimacy;
10. In case of negotiation the degree of correct application will be dependent on the
information of the actor who strives for correct application and the power of both actors in
the following way:
In case of sufficient information of the actor trying to apply correctly and balanced power,
the degree of correct application will be great;
In case of insufficient information and balanced power, the degree of correct application
will be small;
In case of insufficient information and a power balance in favor of the actor trying to apply
correctly the degree of correct application will be average;
In case of insufficient information and a power balance in favor of the other actor the
degree of correct application will be very small;
11. In case the type of interaction is uncertain, the degree of correct application is also
uncertain.
